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1. Chinese perceptions and priorities 
In Chinese foreign policy statements on the Nordic countries, 
one aspect that is seldom left out is their early recognition of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after its establishment 
on October 1, 1949. From the Chinese perspective, this is a 
detail that holds important symbolic value, reflecting historic 
ties between Nordic nations and China. Sweden was in fact the 
first Western country to establish formal diplomatic relations 
with the PRC, on May 9, 1950, followed by Denmark, Finland 
and Norway.1 Iceland recognized the Beijing government and 
established formal diplomatic relations in December 1971, after 
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1 The first Western countries to recognize the PRC, on January 6, 1950, were 
the United Kingdom and Norway. Shortly thereafter, Denmark and Finland 
recognized the PRC, followed by Sweden on January 14. The new govern-
ment in Beijing had, however, decided to “recognize” the Swedish recog-
nition before the others, making Sweden the PRC’s first non-communist 
diplomatic partner in Europe. See Bexell, Magdalena (2000) ”Det svenska 
erkännandet av Folkrepubliken Kina 1950 – ’en lagom blandning av ideal-
itet och verklighetssinne’?” in Diplomatiska Erkännanden: Sverige, Danmark 
och Folkrepubliken Kina år 1950. Lund: Lund University Press, pp.24-25.
Summary
Chinese policymakers have identified a number of priorities that 
motivate them to observe and interact with the Nordic countries. 
While one can assume that the Nordic countries appear far from 
frequently on China’s foreign policy agenda, they have unique 
competences and are open to increased engagement with China. 
Moreover, they are perceived as being easy to deal with and have 
become important partners in Beijing’s effort to forge closer ties 
with governments across the globe. 
This Policy Brief is based on the author’s report, China’s political 
priorities in the Nordic countries, published by FOI in 2014. The re-
port focuses on China’s political priorities in the five Nordic coun-
tries during 2007-2013. It is based on an analysis of official state-
ments, academic papers and reports from think-tanks, as well as 
interviews conducted with Chinese diplomats and Nordic officials 
and scholars in the Nordic capitals during the autumn of 2013. 
The author draws the conclusion that China’s overarching Nordic-
wide priorities include four main areas: to utilise the Nordic re-
gion as a sounding board and door opener; to acquire technology 
and know-how; to promote China’s core interests; and to improve 
perceptions of China.
the PRC had replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the United 
Nations earlier the same year. 
Today, Chinese diplomats describe China’s bilateral relations 
with the Nordic countries as being “comparatively smooth”, 
using China’s relationships with the United States and the 
United Kingdom as points of reference.2 Bilateral relations are 
said to have been stable or improving in recent years “in spite 
of some twists and turns”. This holds true in terms of economic 
ties, which are characterised by a steady growth in trade and, to 
some extent, increasing investment.3 That said, the overall level 
of Chinese investment in the region is modest and economic 
engagement remains limited to a small number of acquisitions. 
The focus of China’s foreign policy is on neighbouring countries and 
global powers. Hence, it is likely that the Nordic countries are of low 
importance, at least in the context of bilateral relations, i.e. outside 
of their roles as EU and NATO member states. Nevertheless, China’s 
foreign policy is also to a large extent a tool for coping with domestic 
challenges and for safeguarding national interests, with the over-
arching ambition of securing the current political system under the 
leadership of the Communist Party. 
In this context, Chinese officials regard the Nordic region as a 
potential door opener for activities in the rest of Europe; as a sup-
plier of technology and know-how to support the sustainability 
of China’s economic growth; and – last but not least – an arena 
for the promotion of Chinese core interests. Meanwhile, positive 
perceptions of China are seen as a prerequisite for success in all 
these areas in the long run. 
2 he quotes in this Policy Brief are taken from statements made by Chinese diplo-
mats in interviews conducted in the Nordic Capitals in late 2013.
3 According to China’s ambassador to Denmark Liu Biwei, Chinese investment 
flows to the Nordic region amounted to 300 million USD in 2014, resulting in 
7.6 billion USD in accumulated investment. Liu stated that China’s investment 
in the Nordic countries accounted for nearly 15 percent of its total investment in 
Europe. See PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Speech at EY Nordic China Sum-
mit 2015 by Ambassador Liu Biwei”, May 8, 2015; According to the U.S. re-
search firm Rhodium Group, total Chinese investment flows to Europe amount-
ed to 18 billion USD in 2014. The figures given here suggest that investment by 
Chinese companies in the Nordic region accounted for less than 2 percent of 
total Chinese investment in Europe in 2014. See Jones, Claire “Chinese invest-
ment in Europe hits $23bn record”, the Financial Times, March 10, 2016.
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Moreover, the Nordic countries are seen as being easy to deal 
with; they are politically stable, pro-free trade and, importantly, 
described as less suspicious towards China than many other 
“Western” countries. These perceptions also serve as an impor-
tant basis for Chinese involvement in the region, regardless of 
the priorities concerned. In summary, from the Chinese perspec-
tive, the Nordic region has a role to play. 
 
2.  The Nordic countries as sounding boards and door 
openers
Sweden’s Prime Minister Stefan Löfven made his first official 
visit to China in March 2015. In Beijing, he met with Premier 
Li Keqiang, who among other things urged his Swedish guest 
to relax restrictions on high-technology exports to China “so as 
to achieve mutual benefits and win-win results”.4 There was a 
deeper meaning to this; either Premier Li was referring to the 
export of products with potential military applications (dual-
use goods) or to the European Union’s arms embargo on China. 
The embargo was adopted in 1989 in reaction to the violent 
suppression of peaceful protests on Tiananmen Square. 
Li’s appeal was in itself nothing new; China spoke out against 
the embargo already in the 1990s. In its two policy papers 
on the EU in 2003 and 2014, China also called for an abol-
ishment of EU sanctions – referring to them as “restrictions 
on high-tech exports.”5 Nevertheless, the idea that Sweden 
would be able and willing to promote a lifting of the arms 
embargo could seem somewhat far-fetched. One of Sweden’s 
most important foreign policy objectives is to promote the 
respect for human rights, i.e. the very basis for the adoption 
of the embargo.6 As such, Sweden is among the EU member 
states that are least likely to lobby Brussels for a lifting.7  
Why, then, did China approach Sweden to reiterate its oppo-
sition against the embargo? Previously, such statements had 
been made in high-level meetings with counterparts from 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. In fact, Premier 
Li’s proposal to the Swedish Prime Minister reflects one of 
China’s political priorities vis-à-vis the Nordic countries; 
namely the possibility to utilize them as sounding boards and 
door openers for politically motivated activities elsewhere, 
not least in the European Union. In the words of a Chinese 
diplomat, bilateral agreements with the Nordic countries 
“can have a positive effect on the EU as a whole.” 
As the five Nordic countries are regarded as being easy to 
manage and predictable in terms of how they pursue their 
political goals, they offer China an environment to conduct 
“smaller-scale, isolated experiments”, similar to the local 
experimentation that the Chinese government has engaged in 
domestically since the foundation of the PRC. 
The example above could serve as a case in point. Other exam-
ples include the strategic partnership with Denmark in 2008, 
the currency swap and free-trade agreements (FTA) with 
Iceland in 2010 and 2013, respectively, and the FTA negotia-
tions with Norway, which China abandoned shortly after the 
announcement of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize (see further 
below). Iceland and Norway, not being EU member states, are 
easy for China to deal with for the simple reason that Beijing 
will never have to involve Brussels in bilateral matters. 
Commenting on the FTA with Iceland, a Chinese diplomat 
asserted that the country could serve as a potential “role 
model” for China’s interactions with small countries. An FTA 
with Sweden, Denmark or Finland is inconceivable due to 
their membership in the EU – but what is substantially higher 
up China’s agenda is an FTA with the EU. The China-Iceland 
FTA should be viewed against this backdrop. China’s previous 
Premier Wen Jiabao also stated during his visit to Iceland in 
2012 that the agreement would “act as a model for others.”8  
Importantly, the FTA means that Iceland – unlike the EU – has 
recognised China as a market economy. The EU’s refusal to 
grant China market economy status remains one of the most 
contentious issues in the Beijing’s relationship with Brussels. 
Hence, the FTA with Iceland is a “side-door approach” to fur-
ther engagement with the European economy.
3. Acquisition of technology and know-how
The Nordic countries, despite being small in terms of popula-
tion, have developed unique technologies and become known 
for their innovation capabilities. The investments and trade 
deals made by Chinese corporations is a reflection of China’s 
priorities in terms of technology needs, at least in terms of avail-
able sectors for overseas investment in the region. 
Judging by major completed acquisitions, it is possible to 
identify three sectors of interest: technology and manu-
facturing (e.g. the 2011 acquisition of Norway’s Elkem, an 
energy-efficient producer of high-grade silicon for solar 
technology and computers), brands (e.g. the acquisition of 
automaker Volvo Cars in 2010), and services (e.g. the acqui-
sition in 2008 of Norway’s Awilco, which provides oil and 
gas drilling services and operates oil tankers).9 These three 
deals were valued at around 2 billion US dollars each and are 
among the biggest acquisitions made by Chinese companies 
in Europe to-date. Additionally, a group of Chinese internet 
firms offered in early 2016 to acquire Opera Software, a Nor-
wegian provider of web browsers, for 1.2 billion US dollars. 
Due to the Volvo acquisition, Sweden ranked four among the 
EU member states in terms of the value of Chinese investment 
during 2000-2011, after France, the UK and Germany, with a 
total FDI of 2.3 billion USD. The fact that the Volvo acquisition 
makes up the majority of Chinese investment in Sweden during 
this period highlights a broader challenge for Nordic countries 
to attract FDI from China: while China is looking to invest in 
large-scale operations, rather than small- and mid-sized busi-
4 His request went unnoticed in Sweden, where the media was preoccupied 
with one single issue: whether or not the Swedish PM would characterize 
China as a dictatorship. Xinhua, “李克强同瑞典首相勒文举行会谈” [“Li 
Keqiang meets with Swedish Prime Minister Löfven”], March 27, 2015. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-03/27/c_1114790890.htm; 
Spegele, Brian, “China Wants U.S. to Drop Tech Export Limits, or It Will 
Shop Elsewhere”, The Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2015. http://www.wsj.
com/articles/china-wants-u-s-to-drop-tech-export-limits-or-it-will-shop-
elsewhere-1429014924
5 Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, “China’s 
Policy Paper on EU” [sic], Oct 13, 2003. http://www.chinamission.be/eng/
zywj/zywd/t1227623.htm
6 Regeringskansliet, ”Utrikesdeklarationen 2016”, Feb 24, 2016. http://
www.regeringen.se/tal/2016/02/utrikesdeklarationen-2016/
7 Hellström, Jerker (2010) The EU Arms Embargo on China: a Swedish Per-
spective, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency.
8 Chen Lidan, and Gao Yinan, “Former ambassador: to Iceland, China not 
far apart” [sic], People’s Daily Online, Nov 5, 2013. http://english.peo-
pledaily.com.cn/90883/8447080.html
9 Azure International/Cleantech Scandinavia (2013) China Outbound In-
vestment Strategies in the Cleantech Sector – Nordic Opportunities, p.17.
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nesses, the extent to which larger corporations are up for sale is 
highly limited in the Nordic countries.10
Few areas are given as much focus during Chinese high-level 
visits and in official statements as the area of renewable energy 
technologies – regardless of which of the Nordic countries is 
concerned. This rhetorical emphasis however remains to be 
reflected in actual business deals. 
Moreover, China is eager to gain know-how in the spheres of 
deep-sea offshore drilling technology (Norway) and geother-
mal energy technologies (Iceland). There is also an interest 
in defence technology, both in terms of imports and direct 
investment (Sweden in particular); however, such deals are 
hampered by the EU arms embargo. An equally important 
priority according to Chinese interlocutors is to acquire 
know-how on Arctic affairs, especially with the prospect of 
new sea lanes becoming available for commercial shipping 
due to the melting of the Arctic ice. 
 
4. Promotion of core interests
In late August, 2010, Xi Jinping – China’s vice-president at 
the time – met with Norway’s then-foreign minister, Jonas 
Gahr Støre, in Beijing. During the meeting, Xi stated that 
bilateral relations would see a healthy development as long 
as there was mutual respect for each other’s “core inter-
ests”.11 Only five weeks later, the Norwegian Nobel Commit-
tee announced that it would award the imprisoned Chinese 
regime critic Liu Xiaobo with the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. 
Beijing came to the conclusion that Norway had now shown 
that it did not respect China’s core interests, and initiated a 
political boycott of Norway that remains to this day. 
China’s “core interests” are a set of non-negotiable interests 
that are increasingly forming part of China’s rhetoric in bilat-
eral relations and in international forums.12 These interests 
can be divided into three areas: 1) domestic political stability 
– i.e. safeguarding the current political system and Chinese 
Communist Party’s continued monopoly on power; 2) territo-
rial integrity and national sovereignty – including national 
reunification with Taiwan and issues relating to Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang; and 3) sustainable eco-
nomic and social development.13 
From the Chinese perspective, the Nobel Committee – with 
tacit support from the Norwegian government – had ques-
tioned China’s political and judicial system by awarding the 
Peace Prize to a convicted felon. China’s ambassador later 
referred to the incident as “an attempt to undermine China’s 
stability and development”.14  
On the one hand, China wishes to steer clear of issues that 
could put political relations in jeopardy, while, on the other 
hand, it will not accept perceived external interference in its 
domestic affairs. In fact, in its interactions with the Nordic 
countries, the issue of core interests mainly relates to chal-
lenges in terms of conflicting values. In countries with a tra-
dition of engagement and activism in the sphere of human 
rights, there is a constant risk that China’s defence of its so-
called core interests will affect bilateral relations.
In May, 2009, China put political relations with Denmark 
on hold after the Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmus-
sen and Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller met with the Dalai 
Lama. Sweden, for its part, has been subject to Chinese criti-
cism related perceived interference in core interests. Such 
cases include Swedish statements regarding China’s human 
rights record and the refusal to repatriate Uighur individuals 
accused by China for having committed acts of terrorism. 
There is also evidence that China is working proactively to 
safeguard external interference in its core interests by other 
than strictly diplomatic means. For example, an official 
at China’s embassy in Sweden was involved in espionage 
on Uighur exiles, according to a verdict by the Stockholm 
District Court in March 2010.15 China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs denied Chinese state involvement in the affair.
 
5. Improving perceptions of China
Media reporting in the Nordic countries on China’s domestic 
policies and its role in international affairs is portrayed by Chi-
nese interlocutors as having a negative bias. Chinese officials are 
concerned with what they see as a predominantly stereotypical 
image of China, in line with other “mainstream Western media”.
In general, Chinese officials express a wish that Western 
media would report more on positive aspects, rather than 
focusing on “negative matters”, e.g. issues involving political 
dissidents. Faced with these challenges, Chinese diplomats 
have an ambition to promote an “objective” image of China 
and to correct what they see as misconceptions. 
While Beijing has yet to launch a soft power push in the Nordic 
countries, it is clear that the Chinese government is increas-
ingly concerned with how it is depicted in western media. This 
is not least due to its interest in creating an environment for 
continued investment activities by Chinese corporations and 
to facilitate technology transfer to China. Chinese officials are 
concerned that negative perceptions of China in the Nordic 
countries could put such ambitions at risk.
Several of China’s ambassadors have published opinion pieces 
in local newspapers on various issues such as bilateral relations 
with Nordic countries, but also to criticize Japanese politics. 
The embassies have, moreover, arranged seminars to promote 
the Chinese government’s narratives on the situation for ethnic 
minorities in China, mainly the Tibetans and the Uighurs. 
10 Data compiled by Rhodium Group suggest that total Chinese investment 
in Germany during the period was only slightly lower than in Sweden (2.5 
billion USD) in 2000-2011. However, Chinese corporations only made six 
acquisitions in Sweden during the period, compared with 33 acquisitions 
in Germany. The number of greenfield projects in Germany was also sub-
stantially higher than in Sweden (113 versus 14). Hanemann, Thilo and 
Rosen, Daniel H. “China Invests in Europe – Patterns, Impacts and Policy 
Implications”, Rhodium Group, June 2012, p.38.
11 It was not clear whether Xi’s statement on core interests was intended as 
a reference to China’s call on Norway to extradite terrorist suspect Mikael 
Davud, an ethnic Uighur from the Chinese region of Xinjiang. See Ege-
berg, Kristoffer and Sæbø, Sun Heidi, “Kinas toppledelse krever at Norge 
utleverer terrorsiktet”, Dagbladet, 31 August, 2010. http://www.dagb-
ladet.no/2010/08/30/nyheter/terror/utenriks/innenriks/utenrikspoli-
tikk/13184834/
12 For an exhaustive analysis of China’s ‘core interests’, see Swaine, Michael 
D., “China’s Assertive Behavior – Part One: On ‘Core Interests’”, China 
Leadership Monitor, Nov 15, 2010.
13 Dai Bingguo, 坚持走和平发展道路 [Stick to the path of peaceful develop-
ment], Oct 2010; Information Office of the State Council, China’s Peaceful 
Development, Sept 6, 2011.
14 Tang Guoqiang, My Rethinking, Embassy of the PRC in Norway, 12 Dec 
2010.
15 Stockholm District Court, Dom 2010-03-08, Mål nr B 8976-09 [Sentence 
2010-03-08, Case No. B 8976-09],  March 8, 2010. 
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The Chinese government’s establishment of Confucius Institutes 
and cultural centres should also be regarded as part of budding 
soft power efforts. So far, however, attempts to influence the 
image of China in the Nordic countries have been rather lim-
ited in scope. Nevertheless, some Chinese interlocutors expect 
that perceptions of China may improve in coming years. As one 
diplomat puts it, “people are starting to see China from a new 
perspective, because of the increasing interest in China.” 
6. China’s priorities going forward
 An important priority for the Chinese Communist Party in com-
ing years will be to absorb “advances in overseas science and 
technology” in order to improve its capabilities for innovation.16 
In the Nordic context, the region’s five countries offer a platform 
for learning and technology acquisition, but also potential 
access to larger markets and cooperation with a wider range of 
international actors.
In the 18th Party Congress work report (2012), which outlines 
the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy over the next five years, 
the Party also pledges to “never yield to any outside pressure” 
and to “protect China’s legitimate rights and interests overseas” 
when working to promote public diplomacy.17 In regard to Chi-
na’s relations with the Nordic countries, this primarily relates 
to its insistence on countries not to challenge Chinese political 
norms. Importantly, when Beijing notes interference in its core 
interests, they trump all other priorities.
The diplomatic boycott of Norway is a case in point. More 
than five years after the announcement of the 2010 Nobel 
Peace Prize there seems to be no politically viable approach 
for Oslo to take in order to normalise relations. Chinese offi-
cials expect guarantees from Norway that a similar situation 
will not reoccur, and suggest a reform of the Nobel Commit-
tee as one solution. If the dispute between China and Norway 
is a precedent, it is possible that Beijing is now ready to inter-
fere in internal affairs of other countries, in order to prevent 
others from interfering in its own internal affairs. 
China has so far managed its relations with the Nordic countries 
on bilateral terms, i.e. on a country-by-country basis rather than 
as a group. China could, however, begin to promote its interests 
in the Nordic countries by establishing a region-wide approach.18 
Just as with China’s economic and trade cooperation with Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries, such an approach would 
involve EU member states (Sweden, Denmark and Finland) as 
well as non-EU members (Norway and Iceland).19   
While a Sino-Nordic platform potentially could increase the abil-
ity for the Nordic countries to promote any common interests vis-
à-vis China, it could be problematic for two reasons; firstly, the 
Nordic countries have yet to create mechanisms for policy coor-
dination and would therefore be in an inferior political position 
to Beijing, and secondly, it could be perceived in Brussels as a 
move to divide the EU, thereby weakening its influence on China.
Given that China’s domestic challenges remain in the foresee-
able future, it is likely that Beijing will keep its political priori-
ties in the Nordic region. That said, one cannot rule out that the 
Chinese government could modify its efforts to safeguard these 
priorities. In regard to core interests, for instance, China has so 
far mainly defended its concerns by diplomatic means. Attempts 
to influence public opinion – which have been rare – could be 
expanded further, especially if Beijing were to improve its capa-
bilities to project soft power in line with its growing economic 
weight. Such public diplomacy efforts could be limited to spe-
cific issues, but would likely be aimed at improving the image of 
China in the long run.
Lower economic growth rates in China since 2013 have not led 
to any decrease in Chinese overseas investment, neither glo-
bally, nor in the EU. In fact, China invested a record 23 billion 
USD in Europe in 2015.20  There is currently nothing to suggest 
that investment flows from China to the Nordic region will drop 
amid the downturn. However, in the event of a hard landing for 
the Chinese economy in years ahead, it is safe to say that the 
Nordic countries will be affected – just as the rest of the world.
 16 Xinhua, “Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress”, 17 Nov, 
2012.
17 Jakobson, Linda, China’s Foreign Policy Dilemma, Lowy Institute for Inter-
national Policy, Feb 2013; Xinhua, “Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th 
Party Congress”.
19 The so-called “16+1 platform” was created on the initiative of Premier 
Wen Jiabao in 2012 and involves 16 CEE countries, of which 11 are 
members of both the EU and NATO.
20 Jones, Claire “Chinese investment in Europe hits $23bn record”, the Finan-
cial Times, March 10, 2016.
This Policy Brief has been jointly financed by  FOI and NUPI and is based on the author’s report, China’s political priorities in the Nordic countries, published by FOI in 2014. 
